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Abstract
This article analyses the impact of chief executive officer's (CEO) educational
background, that is, business degree (an MBA) on corporate strategies. In
essence, the study tests how differences in educational backgrounds,
MBACEOs vis-à-vis non-MBACEOs, determine their strategic choices per-
taining to financial inclusion. The study evaluates this relationship in the
third-sector, faith-based charity organizations (FCOs) context. Using a longitu-
dinal sample of FCOs operating in a developing Muslim-majority country, this
paper reports that CEO's educational background, that is, an MBA degree mat-
ters for financial inclusion. These findings demonstrate how CEO's educational
background shape the strategic posture of third-sector organizations such as
the FCOs. Additionally, the interaction effects further suggest that MBACEOs
derive their imputes from robust sutural positions within the organization
such as role duality, founder and internally hired CEO status. Results reported
in this study have import economic and policy implications.
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1 | INTRODUCTION
Chief executive officers (CEOs) possess heterogeneous tal-
ents and abilities that shape the corporate strategic posture
(Nawaz, 2020). The significance of managerial heterogene-
ity in relation to corporate strategies and outcomes is well
recognized in various literatures.1 The upper echelons the-
ory tenets contended that CEOs' personal traits such as edu-
cation, age and experience determine their strategic
preferences while making corporate policy decisions (see
Belenzon et al., 2019; Bertrand & Schoar, 2003; Hambrick &
Mason, 1984; Jensen & Zajac, 2004, among others). Simi-
larly, an individual's cognitive ability have been linked to a
number of socio-economic outcomes (Jensen, 1998). Empir-
ical studies often consider education as a proxy for cognitive
ability and submit that an individual's educational back-
ground, amongst other factors, explain variations in CEOs
cognitive ability (Datta & Rajagopalan, 1998).
Superior educational attainment—business education,
that is, an MBA, in particular—contain expectations on the
latent ability of the CEO (King, Srivastav, & Williams, 2016).
Various studies have focused on CEOs' educational
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backgrounds—business degrees such as an MBA degree, in
particular—and their relationships with a wide range of cor-
porate strategies (Bertrand & Schoar, 2003; Tang et al., 2015)
that ultimately shape corporate outcomes (King et al., 2016;
Nguyen et al., 2015). At the crux of these literatures is that
MBA CEOs tend to be confident leaders (Malmendier &
Tate, 2005) with the intrinsic ability to develop more innova-
tive business models when leading complexed organizations
(Bertrand & Schoar, 2003).
Taken together, both anecdotal and empirical evidence
suggest that CEO's demographic traits such as education
background, that is, an MBA degree do matter for corporate
strategies. The existing research is however, largely focused
on for-profit-organizations and has ignored the third-sector
organizations, who play a crucial role in developed and
developing economies.2 Third sector initiatives derive their
impetus from voluntary establishments, such as the faith-
based charity organizations (FCOs), to address the socio-
economic voids. FCOs have galvanized considerable interest
among government and civic circles. Their role is even
more significant in developing economies, including the
Muslim majority countries, in which people voluntary
remain excluded from the formal financial system due their
religious beliefs (Demirgüç-Kunt & Klapper, 2013).
Given the increasing role of charity organizations in
promoting socio-economic justice, the importance of good
governance in charity organizations have been recognized
(see Buse, Bernstein, & Bilimoria, 2016; Hyndman &
McDonnell, 2009, among others). However, the existing lit-
erature centres on the organizational positions of corporate
elites and ignores the role of executives who are responsible
for designing and implementing strategies to achieve the
organizational objectives (Jensen & Zajac, 2004). By con-
trast, the upper echelons theory holds that executives' traits
and organizational positions exert a significant influence on
corporate strategies (Finkelstein et al., 2009; Hambrick,
2007). In the non-profit sector, such as the FCOs in focus,
the CEOs are expected to develop strategies that benefit the
specific clientele who may not be the shareholders as such
and rather rely on the incumbent organization for their eco-
nomic survival.
Despite the theoretical and empirical implications, the
impact of CEOs' education background, that is, MBA has
not been tested in the context of FCOs. Pique by the litera-
ture on the demand for human capital, this study notes and
fills this chasm in the literature. In essence, the study mea-
sures the impact of CEOs education background, that is, an
MBA degree in relation to their strategic preferences using
funds redistribution strategies: cash vs. bank transfer via a
formal bank account in which the latter set of strategies
bring the financially excluded (the unbanked) into the for-
mal financial services system, thereby promoting financial
inclusion. The study empirically test the theorizing using a
novel hand-built dataset belonging to 73 FCOs, operating in
a Muslim majority country, that is, Pakistan for the period
2001 to 2017. This is the first study to analyse the effect of
CEO's education background, that is, an MBA on corporate
strategies pertaining to financial inclusion.
The study document that MBACEOs' with well-
founded governance positions adopt strategies that pro-
mote financial inclusion. The main findings observed in
the study remain unchanged when additional variables
such as corporate governance attributes viz. board size,
board diversity and CEO role duality; firm specific con-
trol variables such as size and age; and macroeconomic
variables, that is, GDP growth rate, GDP per capita are
included in the analysis.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 presents
background literature and research hypotheses followed
by data and research variables description in Section 3.
Descriptive statistics and econometric models are pres-
ented in Sections 4 and 5, respectively. Section 6 dis-
cusses the results including the further analysis and
paper concludes with Section 7.
2 | BACKGROUND AND
RESEARCH HYPOTHESES
2.1 | CEO education and financial
inclusion
CEO's educational background is one of the foremost demo-
graphic characteristics thought to affect corporate strategy.
Various studies have focused on CEOs' educational
backgrounds—business degrees such as MBA, in
particular—and their relationships with a wide range of cor-
porate strategies (Bertrand & Schoar, 2003; Tang et al., 2015)
that ultimately shape corporate outcomes (King et al., 2016;
Nguyen et al., 2015). One well-recognized benefit of an
MBA degree—from a prestige school—is the extensive social
network that the appointees form during their MBA study
(Useem & Karabel, 1986). MBA CEOs, thus, put the hiring
organization in a more central position within the corporate
social network, and this potentially create more value for
shareholders (Nguyen et al., 2015). Empirical research on
the personal qualities of MBAs with an economics concen-
tration (Loe, Ferrell, & Mansfield, 2000) suggests that MBA
CEOs typically exhibit superior firm performance and out-
perform their peers during turnaround situations, as they
are generally fine-tuned to manage complexities associated
with the use of innovative albeit riskier business models
(Bhagat, Bolton, & Subramanian, 2010; King et al., 2016).
Others, yet, warn that MBA education fosters self-serving
behaviour among celebrated MBA CEOs (Miller &
Xu, 2016). Bertrand and Schoar (2003), for instance, submit
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that MBA CEOs follow strategies that are more aggressive
whereas Krishnan (2008) observes that MBAs give impor-
tance to self-oriented values such as leading an exciting life-
style and personal pleasure. None of these empirical theses
helps us to discern whether an MBA CEO is, or is not, better
than a non-MBA CEO. The ambiguities compounded by the
aforementioned studies are enormously contradictory. Per-
haps this is because these studies were conducted in the con-
text of for-profit organizations; they used different samples,
assessed different variables and employed the differing levels
of methodological rigor.
However, the earlier empirical work of Finkelstein
et al. (2009)suggest that executives with an MBA degree tend
to make different decisions than non-MBA executives. Fur-
ther that executives with an MBA degree possess auxiliary
skills related to strategic decision-making and, therefore,
hold a greater ability to recognize and take advantage of
opportunities that increase firm value (Lewis et al., 2014).
MBA executives capitalize on these skills to rapidly reshape
corporate strategies in response to any external environmen-
tal vicissitudes. Overall, the theoretical and empirical evi-
dence suggests that CEOs educational background does have
an important implications for corporate strategic outcomes.
Against this backdrop, this study argues that CEO's are
likely to receive solid training in various segments of the
business during their MBA studies that will help them mas-
ter the knowledge and skills needed to lead complexed orga-
nizations such as the FCOs in focus. Unlike the for-profit
sector where the prime pursuit is to maximize shareholders'
wealth, CEOs in the not-for-profit sector are expected to act
more ethically because their self-serving expedients will
threaten the welfare of their clientele who are economically
dependent on the incumbent organization, that is, FCO and
are already socially deprived. It is anticipated that being the
head of a religious charity organization such CEOs will not
allege any misconducts such as conspiring to embezzle
charity funds and will act ethically in the best interest of
their clientele. As vigilant observers of their organizational
milieus, MBA CEOs will apt for strategies—that is, redistri-
bution of funds through a formal financial channel such as
a bank-transfer rather than cash—that will promote finan-
cial inclusion. Thus, the upper echelon theory give rise to
the following hypothesis (H1):
Hypothesis 1 (H1): MBA CEOs are more likely to adopt
strategies that promote financial inclusion.
2.2 | Founder CEO and financial
inclusion
Prior research suggests that having a founder-CEO increases
the survival likelihood of the company. In a comparative
study, professional CEOs vis-à-vis founder-CEOs, He (2008)
report that founder-managed firms possess higher financial
performance with higher propensity to survive than profes-
sional CEOs. Interestingly, the study further note that firms
make additional financial gains when the founder CEO
assumes dual role, that is, CEO and board chair.
Forming a third sector organization such as a charity or
an FCO is different from forming a for profit business orga-
nization. The imprints of founders on the value system, oper-
ating culture and strategic objectives for non-profit charity
organizations is expected to be stronger than the for-profit
business organizations. Because the purpose is to serve the
humanity, founder CEOs leading the sampled FCOs are
expected to support initiatives and strategies that will help
and benefit others. Therefore, the study expect a positive
relationship between founder CEO and financial inclusion.
Hypothesis 2 (H2): Founder CEOs are more likely to
adopt strategies that promote financial inclusion.
2.3 | Internally hired CEO and financial
inclusion
CEO's recruitment path, that is, inside vs. outside CEO is
an important determinant of their strategic choices (Adams,
Almeida, & Ferreira, 2005). Internally hired CEOs retain
superior knowledge and skills to run the concern better rel-
ative to externally hired CEOs. Palomino and Peyrache
(2013) argue that information asymmetry on externally
hired CEO's frim-specific knowledge and skills potentially
depict stakeholders to adverse-selection and moral-hazard
problems. Hermalin (2005) warn that internally hired CEOs
may strive for a longer tenure. This study speculates that
internally hired CEO with enrich knowledge about the firm
may have more informational power, especially, on the
functioning of the company than the board, putting the
CEO in a relatively comfortable position. Consequently, the
board may consider such CEOs as formidable and do not
scrutinize his/her performance appropriately. Thus, such
powerful CEOs may spend more time on internal politics
and retain power at the expense of stakeholders. Hence, the
study expect a negative relationship between internally
hired CEO and financial inclusion.
Hypothesis 3 (H3): Internally hired CEOs are less likely
to adopt strategies that promote financial inclusion.
2.4 | CEO tenure and financial inclusion
Long-tenured CEOs tend to oppose initiatives and are
detrimental for corporate outcomes (Hambrick &
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Fukutomi, 1991). Belenzon et al. (2019) note that the
level of task interest and nimbleness of acquiring task-
related knowledge decreases among long serving CEOs.
Consequently, long-tenured CEOs fail to tailor their orga-
nizational strategies to match the challenges posted by
the external environment (Miller, 1991). CEOs gain
power as they advance their tenure. They exercise the
assumed power to resists pressure for change in structure
and strategy that would antiquate their skills or threaten
their prestige (Staw, Sandelands, & Dutton, 1981).
Linking this to the strategy in focus, that is, charitable
funds redistribution: it is anticipated that long-tenured
CEOs may resist the use of a formal financial services
provider because the allocation or redistribution of funds
via a bank leaves a clear tract record of financial transac-
tions. As argued earlier, longer serving CEOs tend to
holdback information and use the information for their
own advantage, that is, to retaining their position as the
lead executive. Such CEOs may see the use of formal
banking services as a threat to their organizational
knowledge because the financial trail is available easily
form a machine rather than coming directly from the
horse's mouth hence, the rest of the executives including
the board of directors would have direct access to the ver-
ifiable financial information. Therefore, to protect their
position—safe guarded by access to certain information
such as the financial matters—longer tenured CEOs are
expected to prefer redistribution of funds via cash. Cash
redistribution give certain control to the CEO, as the
cash-based financial transactions are not easily verifiable.
Thus, this study expect the long-tenured CEOs to resists
change, that is, from cash to formal bank transfer. Conse-
quently, the study expect a negative relationship between
CEO tenure and financial inclusion.
Hypothesis 4 (H4): Longer serving CEOs are less likely to
adopt strategies that promote financial inclusion.
2.5 | Board attributes and financial
inclusion
The role of bard attributes is well recognized in the litera-
ture (e.g., Nawaz, Haniffa & Hudaib, 2020). Empirical stud-
ies of strategic decision-making in charity organizations
have been relatively sparse to date (Steane & Christie, 2001)
and only a few handful of studies have explored the inner
sanctum of the non-profit boards (see a detailed analysis in
Parker, 2007) with an exception for the FCO sector
(Nawaz, 2020). This study adds to the aforementioned liter-
ature by analysing the impact of board attributes, namely,
board size, board diversity, and CEO's role duality on cor-
porate strategies pertaining to financial inclusion.
2.5.1 | Board size and financial inclusion
The strategic direction of concern is largely determined
by its board of directors. Westphal and Fredrickson (2001)
argue to that extent that board of directors may actually
exert more influence on corporate strategies than execu-
tives do. Similarly, Bai (2013) observe that larger boards
increase social performance of non-profit organizations.
By contrast, Reddy, Locke, and Fauzi (2013) presage that
larger board may upturn agency costs in charity organiza-
tions whereas Cornforth (2001) did not find strong evi-
dence to suggest the impact of board size in non-profit
organizations. Taken together, there is no consensus on
the direction of the relationship.
Although there is no direct answer to the optimum
board size in the context of charity organizations none-
theless from a strategic point of view, this study reasons
that large board may not support strategies that offer
transparency such as funds redistribution via a formal
bank account in which bank transfers are traceable and
auditable. Instead, large board may perceive such strate-
gies as a threat to their authority/jobs and will vote down
such initiatives thereby impeding financial inclusion. For
that reason, a negative relationship between large board
size and financial inclusion is expected.
Hypothesis 5 (H5): Large boards are less likely to sup-
port strategies that promote financial inclusion.
2.5.2 | Board diversity and financial
inclusion
Board diversity in terms of race and gender signals norm
adherence and positive working conditions, which
enhances firm's reputation (Miller & del Carmen
Triana, 2009). Likewise, Buse et al. (2016) observe that
greater gender diversity erodes the negative impact of
racial diversity and improves governance practices of non-
profit firms. Ellwood and Garcia-Lacalle (2015) analyse
the impact of female board of directors on service quality
and financial returns and submit that female CEOs signifi-
cantly reduce negative social outcomes without
compromising financial management. In the same spirit,
Terjesen, Hellerstedt, Andersson, and Wennberg (2013)
report that board diversity in terms of age and gender has
a negative effect on the female CEOs' turnover. Taken
together, board diversity in terms of female representation
on the board merits for further analysis. This is particu-
larly important in the context of present study in which
women are marginalized due to the gender stereotypes
and other socio-religious norms and are under represented
at board level. Female directors will bring divergent views
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to the board. Their understanding of the hardships faced
by the women in a male-dominating society such is the
case for Pakistan where the sampled charity organizations
are located will bring new insights to the board that will
have direct implications to the corporate strategies. In
view of that, a positive relationship is expected between
board diversity and financial inclusion.
Hypothesis 6 (H6): Diversified boards are more likely to
support strategies that promote financial inclusion.
2.5.3 | CEO duality and financial
inclusion
CEO duality is one of the most widely discussed corpo-
rate governance phenomena (see Krause, Semadeni, &
Cannella Jr, 2014 for a meta-analysis). Whether to com-
bine or separate the roles of CEO and board chair is a
lively topic across disciplines (Dalton & Dalton, 2011).
Those in favour of unity of command argue that power-
ful CEOs define a clearer line of authority, achieve
internal and convey sense of unity of command and
strong leadership to stakeholders (Muller-Kahle &
Schiehll, 2013). On the other hand, the agency theory
tenants (e.g., Jensen, 1986) are actively adamant that
dual CEO curtail board's ability or willingness to dispas-
sionately evaluate the policies, practices, and perfor-
mance of the CEO.
To that extent, it is argued that CEOs wield consider-
able structural power when the CEO and chairperson
roles are combined. Due to their power status, such CEOs
are likely to perceive redistribution of funds via bank
transfers as antagonistic strategy, which might reduce
their personal control associated with their desk. It is
therefore, expected a negative association between role
duality and financial inclusion.
Hypothesis 7 (H7): Dual CEOs are less likely to adopt
strategies that promote financial inclusion.
3 | DATA AND ESTIMATIONS
3.1 | Dependent variable: Financial
inclusion (FI)
Financial inclusion is an ease of access to appropriate
and affordable formal financial services to all economic
agents in the society. At its most basic level, financial
inclusion instigates with having a bank account at a for-
mal financial services provider that can be used to remit
and receive payments (Demirguc-Kunt, Klapper, &
Singer, 2017). Empirically, an emerging steam of research
recognize the role of financial inclusion in relation to
economic and financial stability and human capital
development (see, Alhassan, Li, Reddy, & Duppati, 2019;
Jajah, Anarfo, & Aveh, 2020; Ofosu-Mensah Ababio,
Attah-Botchwey, Osei-Assibey, & Barnor, 2020, among
others).
Measuring financial inclusion, however, is somewhat
challenging (e.g., Alhassan et al., 2019; Jajah et al., 2020;
Ofosu-Mensah Ababio et al., 2020). The financial inclu-
sion phenomenon have been approached from supply
and demand side which as produced mixed results (for
details see, Demirgüç-Kunt & Klapper, 2013) that calls
for further empirical research into this phenomenon. In
their seminal work, Nawaz et al. (2020) has developed a
unique proxy to measure financial inclusion, which
focuses on the user-side data while considering barriers
that the unbanked face to enter the formal financial ser-
vices system. The study adopts the financial inclusion
proxy developed by Nawaz et al. (2020). Econometrically
speaking, the proportion of funds transferred to recipi-
ents via a formal bank account is used for FCO i in year
t: FIi,t =
Funds transferred via formal bank accounti,t
Total funds redistibuted by the FCOi,t
as a proxy for
financial inclusion (FI).
3.2 | Independent variables
Consistent with the aim of this research, following
independent variables are included for analysis. For
CEO's governance positons, the study includes:
(i) CEO educational background (MBA = 1), (ii) foun-
der status (founder-CEO = 1), (iii) recruitment back-
ground, that is, internal vs. external hire, and (iv) CEO
tenure. To account for the impact of corporate gover-
nance, the study include board size, board diversity
(i.e., proportion of female directors on the board), and
CEO role duality. In other controls, the study use FCO-
size, FCO-age and operating philosophy as firm-level
controls and macroeconomic variables GDP growth
rate GDP per capita in the analysis. Figure 1 illustrate
the research framework.
3.3 | Data
The study uses a unique and novel—hand build—dataset
on FCOs that is immune from replication. The research
data is derived from annual reports, charity account
statements, charity registers, the websites, local newspa-
pers, personal site visits and other publically available
sources belonging to 73 FCOs, operating in Pakistan for
the period 2001 to 2017.
NAWAZ 5
4 | DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics and correlation
matrix for all variables included in the study. As can be
seen in Table 1, the main variable of interest, financial
inclusion (FI) has a mean value of 0.17 with minimum
and maximum values of 0.12 and 0.30, respectively,
showing the average funds transfer via a formal bank
account during the study period.
Enchantingly, 42% of the sampled FCOs are led busi-
ness graduate, that is, MBA CEOs, indicating the trends
in business educated leaders in the third sector and in
religious charity organizations, in particular. Turning
the focus to CEO structural attributes, it can be seen
that 39% of the sampled CEOs are the founder CEOs
while 59% of the sampled CEOs are internally hired. As
for the governance mechanisms, the average board size
is 6.4 with a minimum and maximum value of 3 and
13, respective. Thus, the average board size is within the
suggested limit of Jensen (1986), for effective monitor-
ing and functioning. Results for board diversity suggest
that the female directors dominate the FCO boards.
Despite the higher fraction (59% to be exact) of women
on the board 52% of the FCO boards are led by dual
CEOs, that is, when the CEO also assumes the role of
board's chairperson.
Among the firm-related control variables, the average
FCO-size and age is 3.25 and 16.43 with a minimum
value of 0.52 and 5.44, and 5 to 32 years, respectively.
Furthermore, 60% of the FCOs included in the sample
follow the Sunni schism. Lastly, the average GDP growth
and GDP per capita during the study period is 4.01 and
6.76, respectively shows the macroeconomic trends dur-
ing the study period.
Although no major multicollinearity problems are
witnessed in the correlation matrix, presented in
Table 2 as a precautionary measure, all independent
and control variables are tested for multicollinearity,
using the variance inflation factors (VIF) technique.
Results reported in column two of Table 2, suggest
that all VIF scores are below the conventional value
of 10. The average observed VIF score is 2.21 with
minimum and maximum value of 1.03 and 3.92,
respectively.
5 | ECONOMETRIC MODEL
Parsimonious versions of the following specification are
used to test the research hypotheses3:
FIi,t = αi + βCEOCEOi,t + γi,jXi,j,t + εi,t ð1Þ
where FIi,t is the proxy estimate for financial inclusion,
βCEO elucidate the impact of CEOs' traits and Xi,j,t are “j”
control variables for “i” FCO.
Financial Inclusion (FI) Founder CEO 
CEO traits 
CEO tenure  
Internal CEO 
MBA CEO 



















6 | ESTIMATION RESULTS
6.1 | Do FCOs led by MBA CEOs enhance
financial inclusion?
First, the impact of CEO's demographic characteristics
and organizational positions on financial inclusion
(FI) is analysed. In Table 3 present results for five
alternative parsimonious of using Equation (1). For
univariate analysis, the baseline model (Model 1)
regresses CEO's educational background (MBACEO)
on FI. This model is then cumulatively augmented by
CEO's organizational positons within the FCO viz.
founder status, recruitment background, and CEO-
tenure; governance mechanisms, that is, board size,
board diversity, and CEO-duality; FCO-level and mac-
roeconomic control variables to obtain Models 2 to
5. All models include dummy variables to account for
time and firm effects.
Results reported in Table 3 suggest a positive and sta-
tistically significant at the 1% level relationship between
MBACEO and FI proxy in all models, except for Model
1 and Model 2, in which the relationship is significant at
5% level, in the same direction. The significant positive
relationship across MBACEO and FI measure indicates
that this finding is robust to alternative model specifica-
tions. This finding clearly support hypothesis (H1) that
MBACEOs are more like to apt strategies that promote
financial inclusion relative to non-MBACEOs. The analy-
sis thus suggest that CEO's education (i.e., MBA) does
matter for corporate strategic outcomes. These findings
compliment the earlier research (King et al., 2016; Loe
et al., 2000; Nguyen et al., 2015), which submit a positive
relationship between MBA and corporate strategic out-
comes. The finding observed in this study suggest that
MBACEOs have divergent strategic preferences com-
pared to their non-MBA counterparts (Finkelstein
et al., 2009) as they pursue strategies that are in the best
interest of their socially- and economically-deprived cli-
entele (i.e., grantee). The study further allude that
MBACEOs act in an ethically correct manner and strive
to deliver the goals of charity organizations.
Turing to the CEO's structural positions, the found
analogous results for CEO's founder status. The results
suggest a positive and statistically significant at the 1%
level relationship between CEO's founder status and
financial inclusion proxy. Thus, hypothesis (H2) that
founder CEOs are more likely to apt strategies that pro-
mote financial inclusion is accepted. Contrary to the the-
orizing, a positive and statistically significant at the 5%
level relationship between internally hired CEO and
financial inclusion rejects hypothesis (H3). Finally, the
results suggest that longer serving CEOs are less likely to
apt strategies that promote financial inclusion. Based on
the statistically strong at the 1% level negative relation-
ship between CEO-tenure and financial inclusion,
hypothesis (H4) is accepted. These results supplement the
argument that long-tenured CEOs are detrimental for
organizational strategies (Staw et al., 1981) and outcomes
(Hambrick & Fukutomi, 1991).
As for the corporate governance mechanisms, a posi-
tive and statistically strong (significant at 1% level) rela-
tionship is observed between board size and financial
inclusion. Thus, hypothesis (H5) is rejected. These results
suggest that FCOs may benefit from larger boards as they
may bring diversified talents, which are essential for such
complexed organizations. Consistent with Nawaz (2019),
these results suggest that large boards potentially provide
balance for effective decision making in organizations,
which are based religious ideologies. On the other hand,
the analysis shows no statistical significance for the rela-
tionship between board diversity and financial inclusion.
TABLE 1 Descriptive statistics
Mean Std. dev. Min. Max.
FI 0.167 0.043 0.125 0.308
MBACEO 0.416 0.493 0 1
CEO-founder 0.394 0.489 0 1
Internal-CEO 0.588 0.492 0 1
CEO-tenure 8.256 2.848 6 17
Board-size 6.401 2.863 3 13
Board-diverse 0.590 0.299 0.2 1
CEO-duality 0.521 0.500 0 1
FCO-size 3.248 1.335 0.519 5.440
FCO-age 16.434 10.276 5 32
OP 0.605 0.489 0 1
GDP-growth 3.110 1.778 0.989 7.547
GDPPC 5.401 0.396 6.119 7.301
Note: Variables' definitions: Financial inclusion (FI) is the proportion of
funds transferred to recipients via a formal bank account for FCO i in year t:
FIi,t = Funds transferred via formal bank accounti,t/Total funds
redistibuted by the FCOi,t. MBACEO is a binary variable taking the value of
one if CEO has an MBA degree, and zero otherwise. CEO-founder is a
binary variable taking the value of one if CEO is founder, and zero
otherwise. Internal-CEO is a binary variable taking the value of one if CEO
is hired-internally, and zero otherwise. CEO-tenure is the number of years
as CEO in the current position. Board-size is the total number of directors
on the FCO board. Board-diversity (board-diverse) is the proportion of
female director to the total board size. CEO-duality is a binary variable
taking the value of one if the CEO is also president/VP/chair and zero
otherwise. FCO-size is log of total assets. FCO-age is the total number of
years since inception. Operating-philosophy (OP) is a binary variable taking
the value of one if the FCO operates under the Sunni schism and zero
otherwise. GDP growth is the growth rate of GDP and GDP per capita






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Thus, there is no strong evidence to support hypothesis
(H6). Similarly, the weak statistical significance does not
allow to contradict or support earlier research
(e.g., Adams & Ferreira, 2009). Interesting, a positive and
statistically significant at the 1% level relationship
between CEO duality and financial inclusion proxy sug-
gest that dual CEOs are more likely to adopt strategies
that promote financial inclusion than no-dual CEOs.
Although hypothesis (H7) is reject, these results add to
the ongoing debate on unity of command and CEO
power (Dalton & Dalton, 2011; Krause et al., 2014) while
contradicting the agency perspective (Jensen, 1986) who
argue for the separation of CEO and board
chairperson's role.
To strengthen this argument the study afford the
opportunity to perform additional interactions and their
impact of FI. Three alternative parsimonious of using
Equation (1) are used to obtain Model 6–8. The interac-
tion analysis is an extension of Model 5 presented in
Table 3. We add three interactions variables as reported
in Table 4.
Results for the interaction effects reported in Table 4
suggest that MBACEOs who are also founders
(MBACEO*Founder-CEO) and chair the board (MBACEO*
CEO-duality) promote financial inclusion. The argu-
ment get strengthen with a triple interaction, that is,
MBACEO*CEO-Founder*CEO-duality. Thus, it is argued
that FCOs led by MBACEOs who are founder and possess
role-duality promote financial inclusion.
With regards to the effects of FCO-specific and mac-
roeconomic control variables, the results presented
Table 3 suggest that FCO-size and age relate negatively
with FI proxy in all models. The consistent and statisti-
cally strong at the 1% level negative relationship implies
that larger and older FCO prefer conservative strategies,
that is, cash to bank transfer when redistributing charita-
ble funds. The macroeconomic variables, that is, GDP
growth and GDP per capita related negative and positive,
respectively with FI however, the results are not statisti-
cally insignificant.
6.2 | Further analysis
The Muslim population in Pakistan is divided into Sunni
(84%) and Shia (16%) as per the schism. The two sects
however, coexist and observe many central beliefs and
practices. There are differences among the two in terms
of ritual, doctrine, theology and interpretation of the law.
FCOs included in this study are from both the schism.
People belonging to each schism rigidly follow their
respective schism and support the schism-based initia-
tives such as running the charity under the flag of Sunni
or Shia charity organization. The underlying schism doc-
trines will have direct implications for those running
such religious organizations. Therefore, it is imperative to
test if schism has implication on CEOs strategic choices
pertaining to financial inclusion. Accordingly, a further
TABLE 3 The impact of
MBACEO, CEO attributes and
corporate governance mechanisms on
financial inclusion
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
CEOMBA 0.00756** 0.00585** 0.0168*** 0.0192*** 0.0140***
CEO-founder 0.0298*** 0.0298*** 0.0270***
Internal-CEO 0.00602** 0.00634***
CEO-tenure −0.0240***
Board-size 0.0262*** 0.0158*** 0.0164*** 0.0152***
Board-diverse −0.00240 0.000468 −0.000576 −0.00151
CEO-duality 0.0579*** 0.0773*** 0.0773*** 0.0715***
FCO-size −0.00823*** −0.00946*** −0.0135*** −0.0140*** −0.0154***
FCO-age −0.00171*** −0.00469*** −0.00606*** −0.00617*** −0.00546***
GDP-growth −0.000468 −0.000435 −0.000492 −0.000445 −0.000518
GDP-PC 0.00217 0.00303 0.00183 0.00122 0.00187
FCO fixed effects + + + + +
Year effects + + + + +
Constant 0.343*** 0.305*** 0.342*** 0.343*** 0.385***
R2 0.395 0.472 0.520 0.522 0.532




regression analysis is performed in the following section,
controlling for the operating philosophy.
Results reported in Table 5 suggest that MBACEO do
promote financial inclusion, regardless of the operating
philosophy, that is, the FCO being a Sunni or Shia
schism. Based on the observed results it is speculated that
MBACEO are well equipped to lead complex organiza-
tions compare to their non-MBA counter parts. Overall,
the results remain consistent with varying degrees of sta-
tistical significance.
7 | SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
This study has sought to provide evidence on the impact
of Chief executive officer's (CEO) educational background
on corporate strategy. In essence, the study test how differ-
ences in CEOs educational background, that is, MBA vis-
à-vis non-MBA CEOs determine their strategic choices
pertaining to a particular corporate strategy. This study is
believed to be distinctive in actually assessing the extent to
which business graduate, that is, MBA degree holder
CEOs sway the scope of third-sector organizations.
A unique handpicked dataset is used to test the
research hypotheses. Consistent with the theorizing, the
study finds that MBACEOs' are more likely to espouse
strategies that promote financial inclusion relative to
non-MBA CEOs. The analysis further suggest that CEO's
structural positons within the organization such as foun-
der status, internal appointment CEO and role duality
incentivizes the impact of MBACEO on financial
inclusion.
This study provides several incremental contribu-
tions. In particular, the empirical evidence that CEOs'
demographic traits and organizational positions respond
differently to corporate strategies, fuels the ongoing
debate over which particular characters of the CEOs are
important for corporate strategies and outcomes
(Bertrand & Schoar, 2003; Muller-Kahle & Schiehll, 2013;
Wang et al., 2016). Notably, no study to date, to author's
knowledge, has examined the impact of CEO's educa-
tional background on corporate strategies pertaining to
financial inclusion in the context of FCOs. Thus, this
study enriches upper echelons theory by bringing evi-
dence from an important yet neglected sector of the econ-
omy. Second, the results add to the premise of upper
echelons perspective (Hambrick & Mason, 1984, p. 193),
which contends that organizations are a reflection of
their top executives, and that organizational outcomes
and strategic choices are determined by their managers'
TABLE 4 The interaction analysis
Predicted sign Actual sign Model 6 Model 7 Model 8
CEOMBA + +*** 0.0132*** 0.0261*** 0.0132***
CEO-founder + +*** 0.0258*** 0.0116*** 0.0258***
Internal-CEO − +** 0.00630*** 0.00265 0.00630***




Board-size − +*** 0.0154*** 0.00970*** 0.0154***
Board-diverse + −† −0.00163 −0.000116 −0.00163
CEO-duality − +*** 0.0712*** 0.0454*** 0.0712***
FCO-size −0.0150*** −0.0114*** −0.0150***
FCO-age −0.00548*** −0.00473*** −0.00548***
GDP-growth −0.000513 −0.000450 −0.000513
GDP-PC 0.00182 0.00228 0.00182
FCO fixed effects + + +
Year effects + + +
Constant 0.384*** 0.379*** 0.384***
R2 0.531 0.577 0.531
Note: See Table 1 for variables' definitions. Robust t-statistics in parentheses.
†Statistically insignificant.
***p < .01, **p < .05, *p < .1.
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demographic traits such as education. The study empiri-
cally test and corroborate these propositions, explaining
the disparity between MBA and non-MBA CEOs in their
strategic preferences pertaining to a specific corporate
strategy. The results confirm the theoretical argument
that individual differences among CEOs will be most
salient when they lead complexed and ambiguous organi-
zations as is the case for FCOs, studied in this research.
Additionally, the study add to the debate on the role
of FCOs in promoting socio-economic justice in the soci-
ety (Clarke, 2007; Harris, Halfpenny, & Rochester, 2003)
as well as on the corporate governance issues facing this
sector (see Buse et al., 2016; Hyndman &
McDonnell, 2009; Parker, 2007; Steane & Christie, 2001,
among others). Notably, the results for the board attri-
butes suggest which board characteristics matter in deliv-
ering the objectives of religious charities. To conclude,
this study makes significant contributions to various liter-
ature streams. It is thus believed that the findings
observed in this study have broad economic and policy
implications, which extend beyond the third-sector orga-
nizations and FCOs.
Despite the noted contributions, the study opens up
several avenues for future research. For instance, future
research may extend this study by following the newly
enrolled unbaked to analyse the extent to which these
financially excluded individuals make use—that is,
opting for particular financial products and/or services at
disposal—of formal financial services once integrated
into the formal financial system. A related area for poten-
tial research is to replicate this study with primary data—
qualitative in nature—to gauge the perceptions of charity
organizations that help and support the unbanked enter
the formal financial services system. Relatedly, it would
be equally interesting to analyse the impact of funds
redistribution strategies on charity's income.
ENDNOTES
1 See, for example: finance and economics (Bennedsen, Pérez-
González, & Wolfenzon, 2020; Bertrand & Schoar, 2003; Datta &
Rajagopalan, 1998; Kaplan, Klebanov, & Sorensen, 2012), corpo-
rate governance (Bertrand, 2009; He, 2008; Nguyen, Hagendorff, &
Eshraghi, 2015), leadership and management (Muller-Kahle &
Schiehll, 2013;), strategic management (Belenzon, Shamshur, &
Zarutskie, 2019; Bertrand & Schoar, 2003; Finkelstein, Cannella,
Hambrick, & Cannella, 2009; Lewis, Walls, & Dowell, 2014), and
psychology and ethics (Miller & Xu, 2019; Tang, Qian, Chen, &
Shen, 2015; Wang, Holmes Jr, Oh, & Zhu, 2016), among others.
2 The importance of this sector is as such that “it is broadly associ-
ated with major economic roles of the public authorities: with the
allocation of resources through production of quasi-public goods
and services; with the redistributive function through the provi-
sion, free or almost free of charge, of a wide range of services to
TABLE 5 The impact of FCO's operating philosophy on financial inclusion
All FCOs Sunni FCOs Shia FCOs
CEOMBA 0.0140*** 0.0141*** 0.0172**
CEO-founder 0.0270*** 0.0281*** 0.00889*
Internal-CEO 0.00634*** 0.0160*** −0.0154***
CEO-tenure −0.0240*** −0.00924 −0.0564***
Board-size 0.0152*** 0.0255*** −0.00724
Board-diverse −0.00151 0.000178 0.000870
CEO-duality 0.0715*** 0.0609*** 0.0812***
FCO-size −0.0154*** −0.0126*** −0.0167***
FCO-age −0.00546*** −0.00475*** −0.00637***
GDP-growth −0.000518 0.000183 −0.000582
GDP-PC 0.00187 0.00145 0.00234
FCO fixed effects + + +
Year effects + + +
Constant 0.385*** 0.309*** 0.526***
R2 0.532 0.518 0.698
# Obs. 981 589 392





deprived people via the voluntary contributions (in money or
through voluntary work) which many associations can mobilise;
and finally, with the regulation of economic life when, for exam-
ple, associations or social co-operatives are the usual partners of
public authorities in the task of helping poorly qualified unem-
ployed people, who are at risk of permanent exclusion…”
(Defourny, 2001, p. 1).
3 For robustness test, the study employed the system Generalized
Method of Moments (GMM) estimator, which produced similar
results. Consistency in results across models strengthen the inter-
pretations of this study.
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